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Abstract
This paper first develops a structural micro-founded model of aggregate net migration
flow using matching ideas to study how migrants choose between multiple locations
using multiple criteria. Migration should reduce inequality in the criteria. Most
migration models either do not handle multiple criteria and locations or lack micro
foundation. The model predicts that migration flows will be out of all but the top two
ranked regions. The empirical work, which uses 1990–1999 Guangdong annual data,
confirms this proposition and finds a high degree of common marginal effects of the
criteria among 18 locations but also finds increasing regional inequalities.
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1 Introduction
Economic models of migration can be put in a general framework in which each pos-
sible location is perceived by an individual to have costs and benefits (Krugman 1992).
Migration of an individual occurs when the net gain from changing location exceeds
the migration cost. Previous research has identified some key pull factors motivating
migration as an expected income gain (Harris and Todaro 1970; Johnson 2003; Todaro
1969), improved employment opportunities (Fan 1996; Greenwood etal. 1986; Zhao
1997), benefits from the infrastructure of an alternative location both economic and
cultural infrastructure/amenities (Chen etal. 2008; Docquier and Rapoport 2005), and
marriage opportunities (Fan 2002; Fan and Huang 1998; Frutado and Theodoropou-
los 2008; Seeborg etal. 2000),. An individual may of course be motivated by more than
one of these push-pull factors and different possible locations may provide different
mixes of these factors. The economic costs to migration include the immediate trans-
port cost but also other fixed and variable costs in the destination location like education
for children (Meyerhoefer and Chen 2011; Plantinga etal. 2012), housing market condi-
tions (Vermeulen-and-Ommeren 2009), regulatory and institutional barriers reflected in
national immigration controls and systems of internal administrative control on migra-
tion like the hukou in China (Chan and Zhang 1999; Renard et al. 2011; Whalley and
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Zhang 2007). Typically the costs will vary with destination but, (apart from the immediate
transport cost) not with the original location. The combination of all these forces applied
to each individual will determine who moves where. In a matching equilibrium, the pop-
ulation distribution between locations and the specific features of different locations are
such that no individual has an incentive to move. Matching theory results by Ekeland etal.
(2004) and Heckman etal (2002) in particular are relevant to our purpose in which hetero-
geneous individuals are sorted into different outcomes by a market system which allows
for pricing by type of individual. Our approach applies some of the insights of this liter-
ature to the migration process, recognising that migration is essentially a disequilibrium
event.
The aim of this paper is to develop a theoretical framework1 which allows for a menu
of alternative migration pull factors in a geographical domain with multiple possible
destinations. Each individual currently resides in a particular location and has to weigh
up the alternative menu of factors available in each different location, together with
the costs of moving to that location. The outcome is a migration decision for each
individual and, aggregating these over individuals in each current location, we derive
the net migration flows between locations. Apart from the theoretical insights gained
into modelling multiple motives for migration and multiple locations, our second main
aim is to use this framework to generate an empirically applicable migration equation
system. We then apply this to econometric analysis of intra-province migration pat-
terns in Guangdong, one of the provinces of China with the highest such migration
rate.
Our main theoretical result is that the interplay of multiple motives and multiple possi-
ble destinations for migration will lead to agglomeration. Individuals will typically want to
move to a location seen as best for the combinations of its advantages. However individ-
uals already living in such a favoured location, but whose individual circumstances have
turned out poorly there, may wish to leave and move to the location offering the second
best advantages. Our approach establishes these tendencies in quite a general framework.
We add some assumptions to the framework which results in a net migration equation
which can be empirically applied in a setting with multiple migration motives and mul-
tiple locations. We apply this to intra-province migration in Guangdong for the period
1990–1999 with 18 locations and 4 migration motives. We find that the approach rep-
resents the data quite closely and that there is a high degree of preference homogeneity
between individuals in different locations. This implies that if moving costs are low, the
equilibrium spatial population distribution should yield equality between locations in the
factors which cause migration. However this is not the case for all factors, in fact regional
inequality has been growing for these despite the high net migration flows. We conclude
that spatial equilibrium in Guangdong has not yet been reached.
Section 2 briefly reviews existing knowledge of factors causing migration and empirical
work on Guangdong, Section 3 develops the theoretical framework, Section 4 describes
the data, outlines the econometric strategy and presents the empirical results. Second 5
contains a conclusion.
2 Literature review
Some of the comprehensive surveys of migration research recognize the multi-
ple push-pull factors which drive it and that migrants face a choice between
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alternative destinations. Greenwood (1997) studies the determinants of migration
in developed countries, including characteristics both of places and of individ-
uals and households. Taylor and Martin (2001) study the complexity of migra-
tion determinants and its impact in rural economies. In the context of climate
driven migration, Lilleor and Broeck (2011) also recognize the variety of migration
causes.
Widely noted pull factors that we subsequently use are:
(i) Expected Wage Income.
In the classic Harris-Todaro model approach, migrants are motivated by the high
wage and the high employment probabilities in the chosen destination. There are
many subsequent applications of these two ideas, for example Johnson (2003) finds
that rural-urban migrants in China move with an urban-rural wage gap of
50 − −70%. For employment probability, Greenwood etal. (1986) find an elasticity
of about 0.5 of migrants to job vacancies, and also unemployment shocks often hit
immigrant workers most heavily Brucker and Jahn (2008).
(ii) Expected Self-Employment Profits.
In European countries, 10–25% of migrants establish themselves as self-employed
in the destination (OECD 2010) and in China it rises to 40% or more (RUMICI
2007) or even 60% in Guangdong (Fan 1996, 1999, 2003). There is evidence that
self-employed migrants are most influenced by the size of market and population
of the destination since diverse social networks are important (Federician and
Giannetti 2010; Kugler and Rapoport 2005). In the UK there is a high concentration
of self-employed immigrants in London (Dustmann etal. 2007) and 47% of the
national self-employed migrants live there (The Migration Observatory 2012).
(iii) Location Infrastructure.
Available local public goods differ by location eg transport and communications,
public health or education services, cultural aspects and these affect the perceived
quality of life in locations (Rappport 2008). Synergies and externalities have a
similar effect (Chen etal 2008). Often these come just from the size of the
population in the destination.
(iv) Female Migration & Marriage Motives.
Globally around 50% of migrants are female (Piper 2005). Marriage is one
important pull factor in the UK (accounting for 40% of migrant settlements during
2008–2010 (Charsley and Liversage 2011) and Asian (Fan 2002; Fan and Huang
1998; Zhu 2002. Another is employment opportunities which may be gender
specific eg in textile industries (Seeborg etal. 2000). Marriage can also interact with
employment prospects (Frutado and Theodoropoulos 2008).
An important issue is identifying and modelling the costs associated with migra-
tion between particular locations. Transport costs depend on the physical distance
between locations (Poncet 2006). In several NELM models (Docquier and Rapoport
2005; Mesnard 2000), fixed costs of migration are used. Institutional and regulatory
barriers such as visas or the hukou system in China Chan and Zhang (1999) create
costs. Whalley and Zhang(2007) conclude that inter-province wage differentials caused
by the hukou system impose a significant welfare loss. In Guangdong (our focus for
empirical work) the majority of migrants initially hold an agricultural hukou (Fan 1996,
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There are n individuals h = 1..n who are each initially located in one ofm different places
i = 1...m. Each individual derives utility from K(continuously divisible) location specific
factors2 f = (f1, f2..fK ). Individuals have utility u(f ) and by definition utility is increas-
ing in each factor. Within each location there is a multivariate distribution of the factors
across the individuals who reside there, so for example individuals h and l who both
reside in the same location may respectively enjoy values of the factors f = (f1h, f2h..fKh)
and f = (f1l, f2l..fKl). This generates intra-location differences. In addition locations dif-
fer in the distribution of factors so there are also inter-location differences, stressing the
role of individual heterogeneity in line with Borjas (1999) and Ekeland et al (2004). For
example the mean or the variance of factors realised may differ between locations (one
location may be relatively rural with a low mean and variance of wages, another have a
more mixed industrial structure with both a higher mean and a higher variance in wages).
In terms of matching theory there is bunching in locations because two individuals who
are both ex-ante best suited to a particular location experience different “luck” in access-
ing the attributes of the location eg by chance one individual may get a better job offer
than the other even though they are of identical productivity. But on average one location
may attract mainly low skilled workers whilst another attracts high skilled workers. Thus
within location utility differences largely result from luck but between location differences
from more deterministic heterogeneity in location and individual characteristics.
In a matching model, Ekeland-etal (2004) have derived a closed form solution for the
equilibrium matching allocation when individual utility is linear in unobserved deter-
ministic heterogeneity but quadratic in the location factors. Suppose that average utility
derived from factors z is quadratic in z, a′z + 1/2z′Bz, and immigrants into the overall
area have to choose their location. Individual deterministic heterogeneity, ε, causes differ-
ences in realised utility between individuals who choose the same location according to
εa′z+1/2z′Bz3. So theN locations can be ranked by each individual with the best location
for ε being maxi ∈ Nεa′zi + 1/2zi′Bzi where zi is the vector of factors in location i.
Figure 1 (Figure 1 location rank) shows the utility available to different individuals from
locating in each of four different locations i = 1, ..4. Locations 3 and 4 are dominated and
optimal for no individual. Any individual with ε > ε∗ has location 1 as their top ranked
destination with second best location 2. Any individual with ε < ε∗ has top ranked loca-
tion 2 with second best choice either location 3 or location 1. Hence the population is
sorted into one group who will migrate into location 1 and another who will migrate
into location 2. If that is the whole story then each individual will locate in his best
destination.
We have to adapt this to analyse movement between locations eg from one location to
another within Guangdong. Each personwithin any given location compares their current
circumstances with what they can expect to attain by a move to an alternative location,
this interaction determines who moves where. An individual h currently in i could move
to location j. If he moves, he does not know exactly what factor combination he will get in
j because there is heterogeneity within a location in individual experience there. He has









Figure 1 Location rank.
to assess the range of payoffs he could get from different possible combinations x of the




Kx which might occur in j. We assume each individual assesses his gross
benefit from moving to j as Eu (f |j) = xπ j(f j1x, f j2x, ..f jKx)u(f j1x, f j2x, ..f jKx). Here π(.) has the





j. It is then natural for any individual to condition his probability distribution over factors
in j on the mean level of the factors there which are observable to the individual, μj1, ..μ
j
K ,
so that π j = π(f j1x, f j2x, ..f jKx,μj1, ..μjK ).
Again locations are ranked by each individual, but now the best off individuals in any
location may prefer to stay where they are rather than to move, whilst those with the low-
est standard of living in a location are the most likely to move. The heterogeneity within
a location may partly depend on deterministic individual characteristics but also in large
measure on differences in luck that individuals have experienced in the current location.
We canmodel this by assuming that any individual who enters a new location has an equal
chance of enjoying the mean standard of living there. They can also stay in their present
location and enjoy their current standard. The first diagram of Figure 2 (Figure 2 location
rank with & without heterogeneity) shows the utility distribution of different individuals
in a given location as a function of their past experience (luck) and type on the horizon-
tal axis, for example ranging from very unlucky to very lucky or from unskilled to skilled.
The positively sloped lines show the current utility enjoyed from different types at present
in that location. The horizontals E1,E2 show the mean utility level that any type of one
location can expect from a move to the other location. Thus in location 1 all types with
utility below currently below ε1 will move to location 2 but all others will remain in loca-
tion 1. Similarly all types in locations 2 with ε < ε2 will move to location 1 but all others
will remain. In fact in our data observed migrants actually have very similar individual
characteristics in terms of age, education, marital status (RUMICI 2007) so presumably
the within location heterogeneity is largely caused by past experience. Also in the data the
observed city factors z in the data actually have strong dominance relations (the same city





















Figure 2 Location rank with & without heterogeneity.
empirically tends to come top on each factor in our sample period). This gives us the sec-
ond diagram of Figure 2 (Figure 2 location rank with & without heterogeneity) in which
the utility distributions of different locations never intersect and the mean utility of each
location is unambiguously ranked. In this case below the best location, the worse off in
each location all move into location 1, but the worst off in location 1 move to the second
best location 2.
The implication is that with homogenous expected utility (preferences u() and proba-
bilities π jx) between individuals, all individuals in all locations will agree on j∗ as being the
location offering the highest Eu
(
f |j) . Any two individuals who presently have the same
factors will agree on the new particular j∗ location that offers the best standard of living
Eu
(
f |j∗) irrespective of where they are currently located (so long as they are not located
in j∗).
However measured in commensurate utility terms, if the individual does move from i
to j he also bears costs vij so the net expected benefit he could secure from a move to j is
NBjh = xπ jxu(f j1x, f j2x, ..f jKx) − vij − u(f1h, f2h..fKh)
The best alternative location for h is then NBj∗h|i = maxj{NBjh|j = 1...n|i} and h will
move to j∗ if NBj∗h|i > 0.
It is also natural to assume that the moving cost vij is additive in ij, that is vij = cj + ci.
Costs based on distance between locations will satisfy this and so will any other fixed
moving costs. There is little reason to suppose that leaving costs from exiting i depend on
the destination so vij − vik = vlj − vlk . With an appropriate choice of units, this implies
that vij is additive. Indeed the exit costs from a location may be very close to zero. With
additivity of costs, the best destination j∗ = maxj{xπ jxu(f j1x, f j2x, ..f jKx) − cj}. If vij is small
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too, then relative to the utility differential Eu
(
f |j∗)−u(f1h, f2h..fKh)will determine the best
destination for individual h.
If an individual is currently in j∗ any uncertainty about the combination of factors
he faces there has already been resolved. However such an individual can still think
about moving elsewhere and if he is currently low down in the distribution of attain-
able utilities in j∗, then he may have the prospect of a higher expected utility by moving
to an alternative location. This location j∗∗ will be the one which is judged second




Kx) − cj over all j other
than j∗.
How does this general framework lead to migration flows between locations? In any
location i there is a distribution of the factors f defined by the cdf Gi(f ) with associ-
ated density gi(f ). Define the lower sets of u(.) by L(u∗) = {f |u(f ) ≤ u∗}. Then there
is a corresponding distribution of utilities in the location of Hi(u∗) = Pr(u(f ) ≤ u∗} =∫




K )ux − cj > u(f i1..f iK ) + ci
will desire to move. If the exit cost ci is zero, a proportionHi(xπx(μj1, ..μ
j
K )ux−cj) could
increase their utility by amove to location j.WithNi individuals currently in location i, the
number who could benefit frommigrating from i to j will beNiHi(xπx(μj1, ..μ
j
K )ux − cj).
However since all individuals not presently in j∗ agree that j∗ offers the highest gain from
all possible moves, the migration flow into locations other than j∗ will be zero from ori-





K )ux − cj∗) and zero immigration into any other location.
However some individuals at present in j∗ will have had unfortunate experiences there
and will be low down in the utility distribution in j∗. They could gain from a move to the
second best location. The number of individuals in j∗ who see they can secure the high-






Proposition 1. If individual preferences and chances of success in any destination loca-
tion are common, and if the migration cost is additive with exit costs being very low relative
to entry costs, migration flows will be out of all but two locations. The two locations with
immigration will be ranked as the top two in terms of the overall standard of living.
This is a general abstract formulation and specializations of it are of interest, either to
derive clear cut theoretical properties of migration flows like comparative statics with
respect to characteristics of locations, including inequality in the distribution of factors
within locations, or for empirical application. One natural specialization that we will use
for empirical work is to assume that Hi() is linear (Hi(xπx(μj1, ..μ
j
K )ux − cj) = k(ak +
bkμjk) − cj) . It is obviously very convenient and can arise in several scenarios:
(i) Specialized preferences
Suppose that in any location the population partitions into groups who are each
affected by a single different factor. For example one group is employees who are
motivated solely by labour earnings, another group are disabled individuals who
are heavily dependent on local public goods like health care. Each individual within
the group for which the kth factor is the sole determinant of utility judges
alternative locations solely in terms of that factor. All individuals in this group in
Simmons and Xie IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:7 Page 8 of 23
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/7
any location judge the particular location j∗(k) = argmaxj xπx(μjk)u(fkx) as the
most desirable in which to live. There is a distribution of the kth factor within
location i which generates a utility distribution for this group of Hik(u(fk)). From
each location i a proportion of individuals Hik(xπx(μjk)u(fkx)) in the k-group will
want to move to j∗(k).
Taking each group in turn, for each factor there may be a different top ranked
location j∗(k) and a particular location may be top ranked on more than one factor.
The immigration into any location j will be the sum of those individuals k in other
locations i who judge j as the best destination on any one of the K factors. So we get
immigration into j of i=jkNikHik(xπx(μjk)u(fkx) − cj) where Nik is the number
of individuals living in i who are motivated only by the kth factor. If the distribution
of the factor within groups is uniform and so the cdf is linear, this reduces to
i=jkNik(ak + bkμjk) − cj. In addition there will be the second choice individuals
who are presently in the top location for a particular factor that determines their
standard of living, but whose present state on that factor is so unfavorable that they
would be better off moving to the second best location on that factor.
(ii) Complementary preferences:
If u(f1h, f2h..fKh) = min(f1h, f2h..fKh) then effectively each individual is constrained
by a single factor (ignoring ties) in their current position. The utility they anticipate




Kx).We can partition the
support of the distribution of f into regions Rk in which the kth factor is critical
(for simplicity in the argument ignoring ties, which have minimal probability) so




Kx) ∈ Rk , f jkx = min(f j1x, f j2x, ..f jKx). If jk is the probability
of the region of the support in which the kth factor is the constraining factor on




Kx) = κjκkεκπk|κ f jk where πk|κ is the
probability of particular values of the kth factor given that this factor is the
minimal constraining one. For example an individual is affected by all factors but
needs both a high wage and good infrastructure in fixed ratios. If the ratio is not
met then his standard of living is set by the lower of the two. Hence his expected
utility is determined by the chance that each of the two factors is constraining, and
then within the region where one factor is critical, the expected value of the utility
of that critical factor.
Under the assumption that Hi(xπx(μj1, ..μ
j
K )ux − cj) = k(ak + bkμjk) − cj, aggregate





K )ux − cj∗) = i=j∗Ni(k(ak + bkμj
∗
k ) − cj∗)










K )ux − cj∗∗) = Nj∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗∗
k ) − cj∗∗)
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will leave the top location j∗ seeking better fortune in j∗∗. Hence we can write the full set
of net migration flows between locations as
NMj∗ = i=j∗Ni(k(ak + bkμjk) − cj) − Nj∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗∗
k ) − cj∗∗) (1)
NMj∗∗ = Nj∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗∗
k ) − cj∗∗) − Nj∗∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗
k ) − cj∗)
NMi = −Ni(k(ak + bkμj
∗
k ) − cj∗)for i = j∗, j∗∗
4 An empirical application to Guandong
China’s rapid development has been largely regional with construction of infrastructure
and establishment and growth of an industrial base concentrated in particular areas.
Resulting regional inequalities have stimulatedmigration, although the hukou system has
acted as a migration barrier of variable force. Guangdong is a Chinese province close to
Macao and Hong Kong, which has attracted government financial incentives for develop-
ment and high FDI from Hong Kong. Growth has concentrated around the Pearl River,
triggering high levels of intra-province migration (2.7 times higher than its already high
inter-province immigration). We use 18 Guangdong city areas as our location units4 for
the period 1990–1999. The cities are heterogeneous: Guangzhou (1), Shenzhen (2), Zuhai
(3), Dongguan (10), Zhongshan (11) and Foshan (13) are industrialised Pearl River cities.
Dongguan (10), Zhongshan (11) and Foshan (13) are traditional industrial centres and
Shenzhen (2) and Foshan (13) are also Special Economic Zones (Nishitateno 1983) with
government incentives. The cities further from the Pearl River nexus, Shaoguang (5),
Heyuan(6), Meizhou (7), Huizhou(8) and Shanwei (9) in the north, Zhanjian (15), MaoM-
ing (16), Yangjiang (14) and Qiangyuan (18) in the south, show lower net migration and
some have net emigration. Finally there are cities (22) and (23) formed by merging the
administrative units of (4), (19), (20) and (17), (21) (Figure 3 Map of Guangdong). The
merged city has very low net migration.
Figure 3 Map of Guangdong.
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For each city and year the variables we measure are
(i) permanent net migration generally involving a change in hukou (NM),
(ii) the population (both genders and all hukou types) (P)
(iii) urban employment (E) and urban wage (Wu) in the top three permanent sectors
(state owned, urban collective owned and other units)
(iv) rural income per capita (Wr)(defined as the ratio of gross agricultural output in
rural primary industry to rural primary industry employment)
(v) a city specific consumer price index  used to derive the real urban and rural
wages wu = Wu/,wr = Wr/
(vi) capital stock K derived from an initial stock, foreign direct investment flows, and a
city specific depreciation rate5.
Table 1 (Table 1 Average value of key variables) describes the different city characteris-
tics (the details of thoes key variables are defined in Table 2 Description of key variables):
the net migration population ratio (NM/P), wu,wr , urban hukou holders as a % of the
city population (Urbanhukou/P), the late marriage rate6, capital stock per city inhabi-
tant (K/P), the number of single females, the population (both in millions of people) and
the city size in million square metres. The first three cities are the key Pearl delta cities
and are the most urbanized, physically small, highly industrialized and with a high pop-
ulation density, the highest urban wage but quite high urban-rural real wage inequality.
Together with Dongguan they share the highest capital/population ratio. Proportionally
to the population, the capital Guangzhou, Zhuhai and especially Shenzhen have a low
prevalence of single females and they also have a high late marriage rate, indicating both a
better educated and slightly older population. At the other extreme, cities 14–16 have low
degrees of urbanization and relatively low real urban wages and real city income although
the rural wage is not very low. The highest inward net migration is into the Pearl River
cities 1–3 and Huizhou and Foshan. The city with the highest outward net migration
is Shaoguan.
Table 3 (Table 3 Inequality between cities over time (coefficient of variation)) shows the
coefficient of variation across cities of the variable in question through time. It indicates
growing inequality between the cities over time in both rural and urban wages and in cap-
ital stock per inhabitant. Interestingly variations in the late marriage rate between cities is
falling but variations in the number of single females between cities and size differences
between cities are roughly constant. Urbanization seems to be spreading slowly across
cities so that variations between cities are gently falling. In a word overall, the rapid devel-
opment since 1995 has generally been accompanied by an increase in inequality between
city areas.
4.1 Applying the Theory to Guangdong
Guided by earlier studies and the descriptive statistics above, we select four factors as
motives for migration:
(a) to work as an employee in the three chief employing organizations7 in j, in which
case the primary motivation is an expected real wage difference between cities.
(b) to be self-employed in j, where the difference in profit opportunities between i and





















Table 1 Average value of key variables
Late Single City size
Real Wu Real Wr Urban marriage K/P(1000 female Population (million
City NM/P (yuan) (yuan) Hukou/P rate(%) yuan) (million) (million) m squ)
Guangzhou1 0.0056 1.49 0.84 0.61 78.51 7.11 1.90 6.4 7.26
Shenzhen2 0.0252 1.62 0.62 0.74 82.21 36.55 0.22 0.94 2.05
Zhuhai3 0.0150 1.56 0.80 0.61 81.96 20.96 0.17 0.61 1.65
Shaoguan5 −0.0010 1.20 0.90 0.34 75.20 2.03 0.93 2.9 18.38
Heyuan6 0.0025 1.28 0.83 0.18 60.72 0.61 0.97 2.9 15.48
Meizhou7 −0.0003 1.29 1.05 0.17 45.20 0.78 1.39 4.6 15.93
Huizhou8 0.0064 1.31 0.81 0.30 75.67 4.47 0.81 2.5 10.66
Shanwei9 0.0036 1.40 0.93 0.23 68.16 0.60 0.78 2.5 5.17
Dongguan10 0.0015 1.34 0.62 0.25 73.78 10.27 0.47 1.4 2.47
Zhongshan11 0.0025 1.44 0.70 0.28 76.07 6.48 0.37 1.2 1.80
Jiangmen12 0.0008 1.31 0.86 0.33 79.48 3.57 1.12 3.7 9.44
Foshan13 0.0048 1.41 0.94 0.41 72.93 8.48 0.95 3.1 3.87
Yangjiang14 −0.0008 1.36 1.05 0.24 68.51 0.68 0.71 2.4 7.81
Zhanjiang15 0.0017 1.14 0.83 0.22 76.11 1.24 1.91 6 12.49
Maoming16 0.0008 1.25 1.12 0.16 64.32 0.95 1.74 5.7 11.45
Qingyuan18 −0.0002 1.24 0.74 0.18 68.91 0.93 1.17 3.6 19.02
Mergedcity22 0.0004 1.37 0.88 0.23 72.36 1.88 3.44 11 10.28
Mergedcity23 0.0007 1.37 0.96 0.24 57.39 1.59 1.82 5.9 22.84
Simmons and Xie IZA Journal of Migration 2013, 2:7 Page 12 of 23
http://www.izajom.com/content/2/1/7
Table 2 Description of key variables
Description of key variables
Wu
wuit = average wage index in top three unitsi,tCPI indexi,t
where, average wage index in top three unitsi,t =
average wage in top three unitsi,t








i = 1...18, t = 0...9
wr
wri,t = average gross rural income index i,tCPI indexi,t
where, average gross rural incomei,t =
gross rural primary industry outputi,t
rural primary industry labor force
and, average gross rural income indexi,t =
average gross rural incomei,t








i = 1...18, t = 0...9
UH rate
urban hukou ratei,t = urban hukou populationi,tcity populationi,t
urban hukou ratei =
9∑
t=0
urban hukou ratei,t (∗)
i = 1...18, t = 0...9
Lmar-rate
Late marriage ratei,t is the ratio of the number of
females who were at least 23 years old at
marriage to the total number of first marriages.
K/P
(K/P)i,t = capital stock i,tcity populationi,t ;
capital stock i,t = Ki,t = (1 − δ)Ki,t−1 + FDIi,t ,
where δ is depreciation rate.
δ = originalKi,t=1992−netKi,t=2originalKi,t=2
i = 1...18, t = 0...9
SFP
number of single femalei,t =
number of femalei,t−number of married and child
bearing agei,t .
where, child bearing age is between 20–49 years old
i = 1...18, t = 0...9
intensity K/P is another. These variables should reflect the demand for services of
the self-employed and their cost determining variables.
(c) to get married/join friends etc who are in j. One measure of the relative desirability
of different cities in their marriage opportunities is given by the gender structure of
the population of single individuals in different cities. We measure this by the
number of single females.
(d) to leave a mainly agricultural city area to move to a more urbanized city area where
infrastructure is better developed, measured by the % of the urban population
holding an urban hukou.
Wemodel the city specific migration costs by amix of a distancemeasure (a city specific
constantAj) and the % of the urban population holding an urban hukou. The latter reflects
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Table 3 Inequality between cities over time (coefficient of variation)
Late Single
Real Wu Real Wr Urban marriage K/P(1000 female Population
Year NM/P (yuan) (yuan) Hukou/P rate(%) yuan) (million) (million)
1990 1.50 0.00 0.00 0.56 . 1.29 0.68 0.69
1991 . 0.04 0.10 0.56 0.22 1.36 0.68 0.67
1992 . 0.06 0.11 0.57 0.19 1.42 0.67 0.70
1993 1.85 0.09 0.18 0.54 0.18 1.45 0.68 0.68
1994 2.01 0.07 0.19 0.53 0.19 1.51 0.69 0.69
1995 1.95 0.08 0.20 0.53 0.14 1.54 0.66 0.67
1996 1.47 0.11 0.22 0.53 0.11 1.55 0.69 0.67
1997 1.64 0.13 0.24 0.51 0.10 1.58 0.69 0.70
1998 1.72 0.16 0.26 0.52 0.11 1.65 0.69 0.69
1999 1.87 0.17 0.28 0.51 0.10 1.62 0.71 0.72
the severity with which the hukou policy is applied in different areas, a high ratio indicates
a greater barrier. Note we are using the urban hukou ratio to reflect two different and
opposite signed effects on net migration.
Our theory as exposited in (1) determines net migration flows from the wage, self-
employment profit, marriage chance and urban infrastructure gaps between cities
together with the migration costs
NMj∗ = Aj∗ + i=j∗Ni(k(ak + bkμjk) − cj) − Nj∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗∗
k ) − cj∗∗) (2)
NMj∗∗ = Aj∗∗ + Nj∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗∗
k ) − cj∗∗) − Nj∗∗(k(ak + bkμj
∗
k ) − cj∗)
NMi = Ai − Ni(k(ak + bkμj
∗
k ) − cj∗)for i = j∗, j∗∗
This has the interpretation of a gaps model (Zhu 2002) in a multi area and multivariate
context8. There are 6 coefficients to estimate for each city giving a total of 108 regression
coefficients.
Having defined the rankings of cities9 such that the top ranked is themost desirable, and
individuals move when possible to the top two ranking cities, the coefficients bk should
generally be positive. There are some possible ambiguities: differences in the number of
single females may proxy the availability of female worker jobs especially in the textile
industries (Fan 2003; Huang 2001) or may proxy marriage chances. Similarly, depending
on whether capital and labour are substitutes or complements, capital stock can have an
ambiguous effect on employment prospects via the demand for labour. Finally, population
can have an ambiguous effect, it could reflect disadvantages due to congestion in an area
or the level of demand for the services and output of the self-employed.
We add a disturbance εit which is assumed to have a zero mean at each i, t and ini-
tially for given i, to be independent over time t with a constant covariance matrix across
cities. We test the lack of autocorrelation of the residuals following estimation using
Wooldridge’s (2002) panel serial correlation test.
Adding the disturbance and using more succinct notation, (2) becomes
NMit = Ai + x|i=j∗Bxi Gapxit + εit ,Eεit = 0,Eεitεjs = σij for all t, s
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Table 4 Description of explanatory variables
Description of explanatory variables
NM Number of net migrants
Ewu-gap
If i= 1(x), expected urban wage1(x) ∗∑ urban hukouj
−expected urban wage2(x)∗urban hukou 1(x)
If i= 2(x), expected urban wage2(x)∗urban hukou1(x)
−expected urban wage1(x)∗urban hukou 2(x)
If i= 3(x), -expected urban wage1(x)∗urban hukouj(x) ;
j= 1...18, i = j,1(x) stands for the highest expected urban wage city
P-gap
If i= 1(x), city population1(x) ∗∑ agricultural hukouj
−city population2(x)∗agricultural hukou 1(x)
If i= 2(x), city population2(x)∗agricultural hukou1(x)
−city population1(x)∗agricultural hukou 2(x)
If i= 3(x), -city population1(x)∗agricultural hukouj(x)
j= 1...18, i = j,1(x) stands for the biggest city population city
K-gap
If i= 1(x), capital stock1(x) ∗∑j agricultural hukou
−capital stock2(x)∗agricultural hukou1(x)
If i= 2(x), capital stock2(x)∗agricultural hukou1(x)
−capital stock1(x)∗agricultural hukou 2(x)
If i= 3(x), -capital stock1(x)∗agricultural hukouj(x)
j= 1...18, i = j,1(x) stands for the largest amount of capital stock city
SFP-gap
If i= 1(x), single female1(x) ∗∑single femalej
−single female2(x)∗single female 1(x)
If i= 2(x), single female2(x)∗single female1(x)
−capital stock1(x)∗single female2(x)
If i= 3(x), -single female1(x)∗single femalej(x)
j= 1...18, i = j,1(x) stands for the smallest number of single female city
UH-gap
If i= 1(x), urban hukou1(x) ∗∑ agricultural hukouj
−urban hukou2(x)∗agricultural hukou 1(x)
If i= 2(x), urban hukou2(x)∗agricultural hukou1(x)
−urban hukou1(x)∗agricultural hukou 2(x)
If i= 3(x), -urban hukou1(x)∗agricultural hukouj(x)
j= 1...18, i = j,1(x) stands for the biggest number of urban hukou city
where (details of the gaps are defined in Table 4 Description of exalanatory variables).
Gapit = j =j∗μj∗Nj − μj∗∗Nj∗ if i = j∗
= μj∗∗Nj∗ − μj∗Nj∗∗ if i = j∗∗
= −μj∗Niif i = j∗, j∗∗
Secondly we have to specify the covariance structure between cities. For each city the
variance is constant over time since it is iid. But the variances could differ between cities,
effectively giving the disturbances a panel structure. Similarly the shocks of any two cities
may be positively correlated (like a common global shock to all cities) or negatively cor-
related (eg if there is some uncertainty over the best destination for a migrant who has
decided to move within Guangdong). We use the Pesaran (2006) and Hoyos and Sarafidis
(2006) test for cross section dependence. The test statistic has an approximate normal
distribution which should be valid even in small samples.
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Table 5 GLS_67 coefficients
GLS_67coefficients
City Cons Wugap Pgap Kgap SFgap UHgap
1 0.819* 0.675* 4.109***
2.43 2.02 4.7
2 16.98*** 3.323*** (−)1.971*** (−)0.230*** 19.49***
6.52 5.66 −3.97 −4.08 6.06
3 2.317*** 0.158***
4.24 5.39
5 1.834*** 0.313*** (−)0.421***
3.34 4.75 −7.39
6 5.570*** (−)0.862* (−)1.614** 0.160* 5.690***
4.31 (−)2.49 (−)2.66 2.24 3.39
7 0.642*** 3.293*** (−)0.379*** (−)5.461***
3.74 8.81 (−)5.37 (−)7.07
8 2.592*** 0.299**
4.64 2.73
9 1.570* 1.143*** (−)1.463** (−)0.486*** 0.224*
2.53 7.87 (−)3.12 (−)9.19 2.26
10 3.333*** (−)0.718*** 0.212*** (−)0.130*** 1.901***
5.86 (−)8.34 7.48 (−)9.32 8.53
11 2.702*** (−)0.290** (−)0.312** 0.109*** 1.136**
4.47 (−)3.04 (−)3.23 5.84
12 2.115*** 0.0689*
3.87 2.36
13 1.190* (−)0.743*** 0.617*** (−)0.891***
2.14 (−)12.55 19.45 (−)8.02
14 2.747*** 0.790*
4.21 2.26
15 1.707** (−)0.656** 0.185**
2.96 (−)2.9 2.61
16 0.7478*** (−)0.340*** 0.352** (−)2.792***
4.09 (−)4.72 2.84 (−)3.77
18 2.626*** 0.886* (−)0.250*
4.16 2.25 (−)2.28
22 6.549*** (−)2.465*** 7.525*** (−)0.983*** 0.865* 14.52***
6.22 (−)7.76 3.4 (−)5.08 2.37 6.68
23 0.226 (−)0.296** 0.813*** (−)2.785***
1.84 (−)2.86 4.71 (−)3.77
*p<0.05, **p<0.01, ***p<0.001, (−)negative.
t statistics are presentated below coefficients.
We estimate the parameters by GLS allowing for the variances of disturbances to differ
by city. In order to check the robustness of GLS, we also estimate by weighted OLS and
find equivalent results. We allow the constant terms (Ai) and all the slope coefficients
Bxi to vary by city through the use of dummy variables for each city. The most general
model has 108 regression parameters10, which shows no evidence of serial correlation or
cross section dependence and also no evidence of panel effects or heteroscedasticity in the
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GLS_67coefficients Y(NM) vs Predicted Y(NM)
Figure 4 GLS_67 coefficients Y vs predicted Y.
disturbances. So subsequently we use a diagonal covariance matrix of the form Eεitεjs = 0
for all t, s and i = j but Eu2it = σ 2i for all t.
We impose zero and equality restrictions on coefficients to reduce the system to 67
coefficients (Table 5 GLS_67 coefficients). The restrictions are accepted on a likelihood
ratio test, applied sequentially and still has no autocorrelation or cross city correlation
(Table 6 Diagnostic test statistics). Estimating the same model by weighted OLS (allowing
for disturbance variances to vary by city) gives very similar coefficients, an R2 = .959
and easily passes a Ramsey Reset test. The weighted OLS residuals also show no sign of
autocorrelation or cross section dependence. The evidence is that this base model with
67 coefficients is an adequate specification of the migration process. The accompanying
plots show the relation between the actual and predicted net migration by city (Figure 4
GLS_67 coefficients Y vs predicted Y). Generally the model is replicating the data as one
would expect, smoothing some of the sharper fluctuations especially in cities 1, 8, 22.
However many of the coefficients are very similar across cities, although there are some
outlying gap-city combinations. Testing for equality of coefficients to group city and fac-
tor effects leads to a final model with just 27 coefficients (Table 7 GLS_27 coefficients)
with a loglikelihood of −29.60 and the model also passes all the diagnostic tests. Com-
paring the plots (Figure 4 GLS_67 coefficients Y vs predicted Y and Figure 5 GLS_27
coefficients Y vs predicted Y) of the actual and predicted values by city for the 27 and
67 coefficient models reveals that we lose relatively little in terms of goodness of fit from
imposing these restrictions on the 67 coefficient base model. We still track the data quite
well and pick up most turning points in the net migration data. The 27 coefficient model
represents our final model. For the sake of robustness we also estimate the final model by
weighted least squares with weights being the estimated standard deviations of residuals
for each city (so there is cross section heteroscedasticity but no cross section depen-
dence). We include a constant term to allow the conventional calculation of R2 (which
is 841). The coefficient estimates and standard errors are very similar for weighted least





















Table 6 Diagnostic test statistics
GLS GLS WLS GLS WLS
Coefficients 108 67 67 27 27
Wooldridge SR F(1, 17) = 4.097 p = 0.59 F(1, 17) = 2.531, p = 0.13 F(1, 17) = 3.55, p = 0.08
Pesaran test N(0, 1) = −1.12, p = 0.261 N(0, 1) = −0.70, p = 0.486 N(0, 1) = −0.59, p = 0.55
R2 0.959 0.841
Reset test F(3, 73) = 0.33, p = 0.80 F(3, 113) = 0.64, p = 0.59
Sargan test p= 0.265
Hausman-Wu test p= 0.42





Real urban expected urban wage gap(yuan) 1.133*** (4.15)
Population gap(person) −0.764*** (−10.03)
City1&22&23 Singel female gap(Person) 1.207*** (5.13)
Urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) 1.769*** (11.68)
City2 constant effect 4.973*** (4.49)
City2 urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) 5.516*** (4.16)
City3 constant effect 0.174*** (7.62)
City5 constant effect −0.107** (−2.60)
City7 population gap(person) 2.110*** (3.48)
City7 urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) −2.122*** (−3.52)
City8 constant effect 0.562*** (4.96)
City8 Capital stock gap(yuan) 0.298** (2.76)
City9 constant effect 0.374*** (5.67)
City9 Real urban expected urban wage gap(yuan) 0.767*** (10.17)
City9 Capital stock gap(yuan) 0.470*** (6.99)
City11 constant effect 0.0317** (3.22)
City13 Capital stock gap(yuan) 0.161 (1.58)
City13 urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) −0.351** (−3.22)
City14 urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) 0.178*** (6.35)
City16 urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) 0.315*** (7.74)
City18 constant effect −0.146*** (−5.12)
City22 constant effect 4.448*** (5.00)
City22 real urban expected urban wage gap(yuan) −2.438*** (−7.62)
City22 population gap(person) 8.206*** (4.70)
City22 Capital stock gap(yuan) −1.022*** (−5.97)
City22 urbanization level gap(urbanhukou) 14.94*** (7.68)
City23 Capital stock gap(yuan) −0.440*** (−4.28)
Observations 144
t statistics are in parentheses.
* p < 0.05.
** p < 0.01.
*** p < 0.001.
tests. With Anderson’s small sample log likelihood correction, the restrictions in the final
model are also accepted against both the initial 108 and the base 67 coefficient model.
There is an argument that there may be some endogeneity in the regressors especially
in the wage gap variable. Shocks in net migration may feed back through the city labour
market into shocks in the real wage. Thus the wage gap variables may be correlated with
the net migration disturbances. We instrument the three wage gap variables by FDI and
employment for the common group of cities and for cities 9 and 22, giving 6 instru-
ments in all (the Sargan test for overidentification has a p value of 0.265) and perform a
Hausman-Wu test of the difference between the IV and the OLS estimates. It is not sig-
nificant (the p value is 0.42), and so we conclude that there are no significant feedback
effects between net city migration and the city wage gap variable.
In this reduced model all cities except for 9 and 22 have a common positive effect of
expected wage differences. The expected wage gap does affect net migration into cities 9,
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Figure 5 GLS_27 coefficients Y vs predicted Y.
22 but to a smaller extent than in the other cities. Only a few cities have a responsiveness
of net migration to the level of capital stock (cities 8, 9, 13, 22 and 23) and in these cities
there are heterogeneous reactions to capital stock. The population gap is important in
affecting net migration in all cities but only the effects in cities 7 and 22 are positive and
heterogeneous whereas in the other 16 cities the response to the gap is negative although
quantitatively small. All cities have net migration effects of their degree of urbanization,
this is an equal effect in 12 cities but there are heterogeneous effects in 6 cities (cities 2,
7,13, 14, 16 and 22). The effect of the gaps is thus common for most cities and most gaps.
The city specific constant terms in Table 4 reflect a relatively constant stream of net
migration which is due to unobservable or non-measured city amenities (Davies etal.
2001). These factors are not determined by the operation of the gaps. These effects are
important in half of the cities and in the majority of these cities there is inward migration
which is not related to the gaps that we have identified.
Generally the gaps work in a way that is consistent with the theory11: the population
gap is a broad exception but it’s role generally is dominated by the merged city 22 which is
very much larger than the other cities in terms of population. There are some other spe-
cific exceptions like the negative impact of the urbanization gap on net migration into city
7, indicating that, for that city, the hukou migration cost element outweighs the benefits
of urbanization. Most of the heterogeneous gap effects can be explained in terms of spe-
cial city characteristics. City 2 has been one the fastest growing cities in terms of capital
stock and net migration. It is a high urban wage, densely populated and highly urbanized
location. City 7 is a northern mountainous city with low urban wage and urbanization,
high population but low population density and low capital stock. It shows high emigra-
tion. City 8 has a relatively high capital stock and low population and its textile industry
base does not yield very high expected urban income, nevertheless it attracts immigration.
City 9 is a coastal city and is the main Guangdong seafood producer with other industry
concentrated on shipping construction. It is a low population and low population den-
sity city, with a low expected urban income and low capital stock, but despite this it has
mean positive net migration. Foshan (13) is one of the industrial tigers with high expected
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urban income, capital stock and population and a relatively high degree of urbanization.
It attracts positive net migration but is neither the leading nor second city in terms of the
gap rankings. Cities 14 and 16 are low expected urban wage, relatively rural cities with
low capital stock and average or low population density. Their mean net migration is close
to zero. The merged city 22 stands out as having the greatest amount of specific hetero-
geneity in the migration response to gaps. As stated above it dominates the other cities
in population size but is relatively non-urbanised although it has a high population den-
sity. It also has low capital stock and at best average expected urban income. It’s mean net
migration is close to zero. Finally city 23 is a similar administratively merged city, sharing
many of the characteristics of city 22.
5 Conclusions
Individuals are in heterogeneous circumstances and any one individual is affected by
many different utility relevant variables. If individuals can locate in different possible
places which also have heterogeneous characteristics, then we would expect movement of
individuals between locations.We develop such amulti-motive andmulti-location theory
to determine the aggregate net migration flows between locations. We add the assump-
tion that all individuals have identical preferences defined over multiple location specific
characteristics and, at a general level, derive the result that there will be a tendency to
agglomeration. All individuals will agree on a ranking of locations from best to worst.
Those individuals with bad experiences in their current location will gain the most by
moving to the location which is universally judged the best. Individuals who have current
utility above the average for their present location may prefer to remain in situ espe-
cially if the migration cost is substantial. So less attractive locations will have emigration
especially of the lowest utility inhabitants while the best location will have inward move-
ment. Individuals who start off in the best location, but whose individual experience in
that location is much below the location average may find it advantageous to move into
the second most attractive location. So on balance the second best location may have net
immigration or net emigration. We would expect agglomeration into the top two cities to
occur. This matches up with some of the settlement patterns predicted in economic geog-
raphy type models. There are some theoretical innovations in migration modelling. Our
approach allows for multivariate determinants and multi-location choices of net migra-
tion flows. People move to places where the chance of an improvement of their current
circumstances in some dimension is highest. We confirm the basic Harris-Todaro insight
that expected labour income differences are important but also confirm Krugman’s view
that each location has a variety of push and pull factors determining migration.
The framework we use is static and one period. We abstract from temporary migration,
planned reverse migration and commuting/guest working. We also work with an individ-
ual as the decisionmaker which allows us to avoid specifying family decision processes
and to derive aggregate net migration equations in a multi-motivation, multi-destination
setting. A partial justification is that much aggregate migration data is at the household
not individual level, and abstracting from intra-family decision rules yields empirically
testable equations. However clearly a next step would be a multi-period and family based
model.
We then use this framework to study the net migration flows between 18 different
regions of the Guangdong province in China. Guangdong is particularly suitable for this
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purpose since it has experienced very rapid growth and industrialization in conjunction
with high levels of inward immigration from the other Chinese provinces, and even
higher levels of intra-province migration. We divide Guangdong into 18 city areas which
have varying degrees of urbanization and use panel data on these 18 cities for 1990–
1999 to econometrically investigate net migration flows between the cities allowing for
cross section heteroscedasticity. We find that net migration into the majority of cities
can be well explained by a common set of parameters. There is some limited heterogene-
ity between cities in how net migration responds to the differentials, out of a potential
total of 90 city-differential heterogeneities we find that we need just 15 specific coeffi-
cients. The remaining heterogeneities are in the impacts of capital stock and the degree
of urbanization. Nearly half of the cities share a common mean amount of net migration
which is unrelated to the four differentials we identified. No cross section dependence
and serial correlation are detected in the final model. In terms of goodness of fit and
tracking the data city by city, our model performs well and there is no evidence of model
misspecification.
In a locational equilibrium, the net benefits of moving between cities should be equal-
ized. In fact inequality between cities in some of the relevant factors has increased not
fallen over our sample. The coefficient of variation of urban/rural income and capital
stock per capita suggest that inequalities between cities are increasing over time. Taken
together, the rising inequality in some migration inducing factors may imply that a full
locational equilibrium has not yet been achieved.
It is well known that Chinese labour migration is substantial and exhibits different
types of flows. It is widely argued to be a very important component in rapid Chinese
growth and development, thus its policy importance is clear. Although the data sources
are much more abundant than 20 years ago, there is still a paucity of degrees of free-
dom and coverage of some of the relevant factors. This forces some imperfection in our
modelling strategy, but, given this, the results here are robust to a range of specification
tests.
Endnotes
1To our knowledge, our work is the first to aggregate migration flows from individual
decisions allowing for multiple pull factors and multiple locations. Bazzi (2012) devel-
ops a microfounded model of aggregate migration flows to study to what extent financial
barriers limit international migration. But he did not consider multiple pull factors and
multiple location choices.
2 The idea is that the factors measure variables like the wage, employment opportuni-
ties, infrastructiure and local public goods, profit prospects for self-employed individuals,
marriage prospects, etc.
3 In fact in this special case where the matching is one-sided, if the realised utility has the
form εf (z) + g(z), where f (·) > 0 the same argument follows.
4 These are an aggregation of the 21 adminstrative city areas to ensure unique boundaries
over 1990–1999. Each city area has both an urban and rural part. The data is taken from
Guangdong Statistical Yearbooks Guangdong Statistical Yearbook (1990–1999).
5Kt = (1− δ)Kt−1 +FDIt , where δ is the depreciation rate. The base value of capital stock
is given by the 1992 historic cost value of assets. The depreciation rate is computed as the
% difference between the net value of fixed assets and the historic value of fixed assets in
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1992, the mean of this is about 25%.
6 Defined as the number of females who were at least 23 years old at marriage as a pro-
portion of the total number of first marriages.
7 These are either state or urban collective units, or private sector units with joint owner-
ship, shareholding or foreign ownership (ie excluding self-employment).
8Instead of thinking of the distribution of the factor within a city, this can be interpreted
as saying for example that net (and gross) migration from a city ranked three or lower into
the top city is the total factor gain from the lower rank city achieving the mean factor of
the top city. We can also identify the constant term with a combination of a constant net
migration flow unrelated to the gaps (giving a positive Ai) and a moving cost effect which
deters some of the net migration driven by the gaps(giving a negative Ai).
9 The ranking of cities on different factors may vary with time. Broadly the Pearl delta
cities (1,2,3), Foshan and city 22 are generally ranked in the top two on most factors. The
implication is that we should expect to see intra-Guangdong emigration from the remain-
ing thirteen cities which are never ranked in the top two on any criterion for migration
but inward immigration into the ranked cities.
10 In fact we drop one regressor to avoid multicollinearity, leaving 107 coefficients.
11Since we have scaled the regressors to have zero mean and unit variance across the
whole sample, the estimated coefficients are largely independent of the units in which we
measure variables. So we do not compute distinct elasticities.
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